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Summary
In the light of today’s global security challenges such as terrorist attacks, immigrant 
crises or piracy, this paper presents the results of a survey conducted on a sample of 
experienced maritime offi  cers covering the use of ISPS Code on board. Research data 
was collected through questionnaires. The analysis of the collected data followed 
by subsequent discussions with the participants yielded surprising answers. The 
synthesis of those results suggests that the procedures implemented to increase 
the security aboard the ship could jeopardize the crew’s safety if implemented 
inadequately. In this case, the responsibility for the poor implementation is not 
always just on the crew, as the company should also be involved in checking and 
correction. Consequently, opinions and recommendations that can serve as an 
example of good practice are provided in the conclusion.
Sažetak
U svjetlu današnjih globalnih sigurnosnih izazova kao što su teroristički napadi, 
imigrantska kriza ili piratstvo, ovaj rad prezentira rezultate ankete provedene na 
uzorku iskusnih pomorskih časnika koji primjenjuju ISPS Pravilnik na brodu. Podaci 
su prikupljeni putem upitnika. Analiza prikupljenih podataka, dopunjena kasnijim 
razgovorima sa sudionicima, dala je iznenađujuće odgovore. Sinteza ovih rezultata 
sugerira da postupci provedeni kako bi se povećala sigurnost na brodu mogu ugroziti 
sigurnost posade ako se provode neadekvatno. U ovom slučaju odgovornost za lošu 
provedbu nije uvijek na posadi budući da bi kompanija trebala biti uključena u provjeru 
i korekcije. Slijedom toga, mišljenja i preporuke koji mogu poslužiti kao primjer dobre 













1. INTRODUCTION / Uvod
There are diff erent security threats to Maritime Industry: 
terrorism, piracy and armed robbery against ships, the 
possibility of a biological and chemical attack, smuggling and 
human traffi  cking, stowaways, theft, sabotage, cyber-crimes, 
etc. [3] [1]
The ISPS Code (International Ship and Port Security 
Code, 2004) is intended to be preventive measure. It gives 
governments, shipping companies, shipboard personnel, and 
port facility personnel the responsibility of detecting security 
threats and taking preventative measures against security 
incidents aff ecting ships or port facilities used in international 
trade. [2]
According to the ISPS Code, a company security offi  cer 
and ship security offi  cer have to be appointed. It is clear that 
those people must go through training, since they are required 
to have certain knowledge regarding the ISPS Code. On board 
personnel have specifi c duties and responsibilities involving 
security that they need to practice during drills to ensure that 
the crew is profi cient in all the assigned security duties. [5]
Although it seems simple, sometimes those drills may be 
counterproductive if conducted in a wrong way. [4]
2. METHODOLOGY / Metodologija
The results of the research presented in this paper were 
obtained by analyzing the data collected from questionnaires 
and subsequent discussion with participants of ‘Leadership 
and teamwork’ training courses held on the Maritime Faculty in 
Rijeka, Croatia in 2016. Participants were experienced seamen, 
all employed on diff erent companies and diff erent ships 
worldwide. 
There were 464 participants in total who had been asked to 
answer the following questions:
a) Do you have any knowledge about the ISPS Code?
b) Have you been involved in any ISPS Code drills or training 
on board in the last year?
c) Can you specify the example(s) of the drills or training 
you’ve participated in?
d) Can you briefl y specify the ‘conducting procedure’ for each 
training?
The answers are presented in Table 1.
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Table 1 The number of participants who answered the 
questions
Tablica 1. Broj sudionika koji su odgovorili na pitanja
Answer








a) 464 0 - - - -
b) 462 2* - - - -
c) 462 2* 462 455 453 7
* Domestic shipyard dry dock staff .
Source: authors
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When requested to specify ‘conducting procedure’ (question 
d) for each training the participants had answered:
a) Pirate attack:
 - Securing ship openings (doors, windows, hatches, etc.)
 - Extra watch on deck (fore and aft)
 - Extra lights around the ship
 - Fire pump running and fi re hoses prepared
 - Engine room ready for maneuvering, etc. 
b) Bomb search:
 - The master of the ship hid the ‘bomb’ on board the ship 
 - Each crew member was involved in searching for the ‘bomb’
 - Each crew member was searching in those spaces that are 
familiar to him/her in particular (personal cabins, lockers, 
working places, closets, etc.)
c) Searching for stowaways:
 - The ship’s crew was divided in teams
 - The ship’s spaces were divided in searching sections
 - Each team had a section to search.
d) Unidentifi ed object detection:
 - The master of the ship placed an unidentifi ed object aboard 
the ship
 - Each crew member was involved in detecting the object
 - Each crew member entered those spaces that are familiar to 
him/her and had to look around (360o) trying to recognize 
the object that had not been there before
 - When detected, the Master and the rest of the crew had to 
be informed
 - It was not allowed to touch the object, but rather to secure 
it and evacuate the area.
3. ANALYSIS AND RESULTS / Analiza i rezultati
By analyzing results obtained as proportion of 98,5 % “Bomb 
search” answers respecting to 1,5 % “Unidentifi ed object 
detection” (chart 1.) and taking into consideration description of 
conduction procedure there were three hypothesis raised upon. 
Hypothesis 1: 
Seamen that are conducting „Bomb search” drill know what 
are they looking for, and seamen conducting „Unidentifi ed 
object detection” drill do not.
Hypothesis 2: 
Seamen that are conducting “Bomb search” drill will interact 
with the object and those conducting “Unidentifi ed object 
detection” drill will not.
1 The result shown is including all separate scenario cases (in ex. attack in port, 
attack at the anchorage and attack during navigation)
Chart 1 Bomb search vs. Unidentifi ed object detection




Seamen that are conducting “Bomb search” drill will more 
likely interact with the object upon fi nding because they know 
what are they searching for.
Due to such circumstances two extra questions were asked: 
1. Did you know what were you searching for? (Identifi cation 
of the object.)
2. Did you touch that what you were searching for upon 
fi nding? (Interaction with the object.)
1. Seamen conducting „Bomb search“ drill knew what they 
were searching for in 94,5% of cases while those conducting 
„Unidentifi ed object detection“ drill did not know it, meaning 
that their percentage is 0, as shown in Chart 2.
Hypothesis 1 have found to be proven.
Chart 2 Identifi cation of the object
Grafi kon 2. Identifi kacija objekta
Source: authors
2. Seaman conducting „Bomb search“ drill interacted 
with the object in 100% opposed to 0% of those conducting 
„Unidentifi ed object search“, as shown in Chart 3.
Hypothesis 2 and hypothesis 3 have found to be proven.
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Chart 3 Interaction with the object
Grafi kon 3. Interakcija s objektom
Source: authors
4. DISCUSSION / Rasprava
The procedures of ‘Bomb search’ and ‘Unidentifi ed object 
detection’ are quite similar but diff erent in approach. In the 
latter, instead of searching for the ‘bomb’ the crew is instructed 
just to detect the object that might have been placed on the 
ship without the knowledge of the crew. Those participants that 
had answered ‘Unidentifi ed object detection’ did not mention 
‘Bomb search’ at all claiming to have received such instructions 
from the company that they were employed by.
The ISPS Code aff ects the crew on board in the way that they 
will be the fi rst victim when an incident threatening security 
happens. They have to be aware and prepared for defense and 
a quick response. Because of that, there should be procedures 
established on board, with duties and responsibilities 
clearly defi ned. Knowledge of those procedures, duties and 
responsibilities is to be checked regularly through on board 
trainings and drills as well as thorough internal and external 
audits. 
When it comes to the practice, there is a possibility of 
dangerous behavior on board as well as in the security policies 
of some companies. The purpose and the goal of on board 
trainings and drills is to keep the crew ready for a response in 
the case any ISPS scenario happening. The results of research 
showed that the way they are trained on board should be 
reconsidered in too many cases, and fi ndings are summarized 
as follow:
 - Crew members should be aware of piracy, should know 
the procedures of preparing the ship against embarkation 
of pirates, should be familiar with equipment placed on 
board to prevent embarkation (i.e. how to place a razor wire 
around the ship), …, but, nobody can expect that in the case 
of a real pirate attack they are going to fi ght against pirates, 
and nobody can ask them to do that, because they are not 
trained to combat but to sail the vessels. Placing the devices 
such as ‘air guns’ or training the crew to prepare the ‘fi re 
hoses’ to prevent embarkation of pirates by water jetting is 
simply a wrong way of training and such practice should be 
avoided. Companies whose ships are sailing through pirates’ 
areas should take in consideration sailing with professional 
security escort through the area. Crew members should be 
aware that by ‘trying to be a hero’ in such situations they 
might endanger their own lives in a way that they are not 
only going to be hostages but someone might get killed. 
The policy: ‘In case of piracy – don’t be a hero!’ is a good 
practice.
 - ‘Bomb search’ training. The very name (title) of the drill is 
completely wrong and sends a dangerous message. It is not 
quite clear if the name of the drill originates from offi  cial on 
board documents or is just a colloquial term used on board 
among the crew, but it should be completely changed and 
avoided. Seamen, generally, do not have any competence in 
recognizing bombs, explosives, weapons, etc. Those things 
are not taught at maritime schools and faculties, nor are 
there a lot of opportunities to learn them from on board 
experience. Having a certifi cate of a course on ISPS seems 
not to indicate serious knowledge on the topic.
 - The Master of the vessel has an overall responsibility for on 
board trainings and drills and to motivate crew members 
in practicing. The ‘motivation’ approach referred to in this 
research (‘placing an object of value as a hidden bomb 
that should serve as award when found’) is unforgivable 
and should be prohibited. It is hard to believe that such an 
approach comes from Company Offi  cials, and it is rather a 
misinterpretation by the Master himself / herself. If Company 
Offi  cials are not aware of such things happening on board 
they also have a share of the responsibility.
 - There are Companies with a diff erent practice in place, in 
which they implement a diff erent approach. ‘Unidentifi ed 
object detection’ suggests that the crew should be aware 
of the risk that might arise from the placing of an object 
on board whose origin is unknown, and once detected 
the procedure is quite clear to crew members. So there is 
no need to search for something that might be a ‘bomb’ 
because crew members do not know what a bomb looks 
like and in many cases even professionals can’t be sure 
either without using special equipment.  
 
5. CONCLUSION / Zaključak
When it comes to good practice there are a lot of obstacles to 
implement the security barrier that is the ISPS Code applied on 
board and it is not a separate case.
The survey questionnaire encompassed a wide range of 
questions and discussions, but the results here presented are 
focused on onboard security issues only. They are justifying 
the opinion that the ISPS Code, which is welcomed in 
Maritime Industry considering global security threats, must be 
implemented with special care and procedures well defi ned, 
explained, trained and checked as it was conceived by The Code 
at the very beginning.
Although on board safety and security issues are sometimes 
mutually exclusive, it should be clearly stated that security 
procedures should never jeopardize the crew’s safety.
Further research is focused on analyzing onboard security 
vs. port security practice while berthing.
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